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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
COMPETITION BILL
Peter W. Hogg and Warren Grover*
The Competition Bill
Description
The proposed amendments to the Combines Investigation Act which
are now (in December, 1975) before the federal Parliament are the result
of a long history of study and debate.' On July 22, 1966, the Economic
Council of Canada was requested to advise the federal Government
regarding combines, mergers, monopolies and restraint of trade. In July
1969, in the Interim Report on Competition Policy (which is, despite its
title, the final report) the Economic Council proposed a new approach to
competition policy in Canada. In June 1971, that approach was
introduced in legislative form, as Bill C-256 in the House of Commons.
After two full years of discussion with all interested parties it was
decided to introduce the new policies in two phases. The first phase,
which proceeded by way of amendment to the existing Combines
Investigation Act, was introduced into the federal Parliament in
November 1973 as Bill C-227. In March 1974, the Bill was reintroduced, unchanged, as Bill C-7 and again in October 1974 as Bill C-2.
Hereafter we refer to Bill C-2 as the Competition Bill.
The Competition Bill can be divided into six major areas:
(1) The extension of the existing Combines Investigation Act to
embrace the service industries.
(2) The extension of the powers of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission to include the issue of both positive and negative
orders where certain specified trade practices or foreign decrees are
found to interfere with the competitive process.
(3) The extension of the prohibited practices set forth in the Combines
The Authors are Professors of Law at the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
This article is an abridged version of a paper written for the federal Government's
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in May, 1975.
Since this article was written, the Bill has received Royal Assent (December 15, 1975) as
1974-75-76, c. 76. The amendments were proclaimed to come into force on January 1, 1976,
with the exception of the prohibition on price-fixing in the service sectorwhich was proclaimed to
come into force on July 1, 1976.
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Investigation Act to include bid-rigging and combinations in the
field of professional sports.
(4) The extension of the misleading advertising offences to a wider
panoply of consumer related practices, such as double ticketing,
lotteries, warranties, pyramid selling, referral selling and bait and
switch selling.
(5) The introduction of new forms of relief, including a civil action for
damages and the issue of an interim injunction in certain cases.
(6) Procedural changes, including new rules as to the admissibility of
evidence, but particularly the granting to the Federal Court of
Canada of jurisdiction to try offences alleged to be committed by
corporations under the statute, whether or not the accused agrees.
Purpose
The economic and social policies of the Competition Bill are set out in
The Economic Council of Canada's Interim Report on Competition
Policy (1969) which, as explained, is the genesis of the present Bill. The
objective of the Bill is to maximize competition within the private
sectors in the Canadian economy. The Economic Council summed up
the argument by saying that competition policy in Canada reflects a
belief that, "over the greater part of the economy, competitive market
forces are potentially capable of allocating resources better and more
cheaply, with a less cumbersome administrative overhead, than any
alternative arrangements such as wholesale public ownership and
control, detailed government regulation of enterprise, or self-regulation
by large industrial units within a corporate state". (Interim Report on
Competition Policy (1969), 8).
This view represents, of course, a particular political and economic
point of view, and one which does not command universal acceptance
even within the Western capitalist countries. But the point is that this is
the policy foundation upon which the Competition Bill is built. No
Canadian court would be so bold as to reject the policy of the elected
Government on the ground that it was mistaken or unwise. We think we
may safely assume that the Supreme Court of Canada would feel obliged
to accept the assumptions of Government policy which underlie the
Competition Bill. In the event of a challenge, it will be vital for the
Government to ensure that the policies underlying the Bill are clearly
communicated to the court, either through evidence, argument or an
extended factum.
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National character
It is surely obvious that major regulation of the Canadian economy
has to be national. Goods and services, and the cash or credit which
purchases them, flow freely from one part of the country to another
without regard for provincial boundaries. Indeed, a basic concept of the
federation is that it must be an economic union. An over-all national
policy is the key to efficiency in the production of goods and services.
Each province of the country is differently endowed with natural
resources, capital, labour and access to consumers. The result is that
each province will be able to produce some products or services more
efficiently than others. The introduction of an effective competition
policy can be seen as one method to ensure that these differing regional
advantages will accrue to the nation as a whole in terms of lower prices,
better quality and variety, and increased opportunities for Canadians.
Any attempt to achieve an optimal distribution of economic activity
must transcend provincial boundaries, for, in many respects, Canada is
one huge marketplace. To some extent the marketplace is even
international because of the flow of goods, services, cash and credit
across international boundaries. But the degree to which Canada
remains open to the rest of the world is constitutionally within the
legislative power of the federal Parliament. Of course in recent years
there has been a general lowering of national trade barriers and an
increasing number of international trade agreements. In real terms
Canada has become increasingly interdependent with other countries,
and even the federal Government's capacity to act is often circumscribed. But the provinces cannot possibly exercise significant control
over conditions created by international or national economic forces.
(See generally Safarian, CanadianFederalismand Economic Integration (Information Canada, 1973) ).
The relative unimportance of provincial boundaries has become
progressively more obvious as industry has tended to become more
concentrated. Improved communications and transportation have increased the mobility of labour, capital and technology, as well as raw
materials and the finished product. This mobility has enabled larger
business units to develop in order to take advantage of the economies of
mass production, mass distribution, and mass advertising. Increasingly,
industry is organized on a national or even multi-national basis. Labour
tends to be organized on a national or international basis too. These
developments carry serious risks that the participants in an industry will
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be in a position to control the market for that industry's products and
avoid both the bracing wind of competition and effective governmental
regulation. With respect to international businesses, it is difficult for
even a national Government to exert effective control over an
organization which crosses national boundaries and is able to order its
affairs in ways which minimize the impact of any one country's laws. It
is even more difficult for a province to do so.
With respect to businesses which are confined to Canada, with few
exceptions, any individual or corporation, including a provincially
incorporated corporation, has the capacity to "walk across" provincial
boundaries in order to buy or sell, lend or borrow, hire or fire. In the
absence of artificial impediments, therefore, the market for goods and
services is competitive on a national basis, and provincial legislation
cannot be an effective regulator. Indeed, even a purely local business,
such as a comer store or a hairdresser, is within the national or
international flow of trade in that the proprietor is in competition with
businesses which do extend beyond the locality, and his ability to enter
the field in the first place, and to remain in it, may depend upon the
control of anti-competitive practices on a national scale. The products
he uses in his business will be largely produced and sold to him by
corporations which trade nationally and internationally. Even his
capacity to move to a different province helps to sustain competition in
the market for his goods and services on a national basis, and makes it
apparent that local legislation might have unanticipated effects. Competition policy must be national, even in its application to local businesses.
In summary, we believe that the regulation of the competitive sector
of the economy can be effectively accomplished only by federal action.
If there is no federal power to enact a competition policy, then Canada
cannot have a competition policy. The consequence of a denial of
federal constitutional power is therefore, in practical effect, a gap in the
distribution of legislative powers. We believe that the Supreme Court of
Canada would be anxious to avoid the drastic consequence of denying
the existence of federal power in light of current economic and social
realities.
Constitutional Power
The major provisions of the British North America Act, 1867 which
are relevant to this paper are set out below:
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91. It shall be lawful for the [federal Parliament] to make Laws for the Peace,
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of
the foregoing . . . the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada
extends to all Matters coming with the Classes of Subjects next herein-after
enumerated; that is to say,2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to
Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is
to say,13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.

In order to support the Competition Bill three heads of federal power
could be invoked: first, the "peace, order, and good government
power" (sometimes called the "general" or "residuary" power),
which is contained in the opening words of s. 91; secondly, the "trade
and commerce power", which is contained in s. 91(2); and thirdly, the
"criminal law power", which is contained in s. 91(27).
We take the view that the appropriate classification of the Competition Bill is as a law in relation to "the regulation of trade and
commerce", and that accordingly it is valid under the trade and
commerce power. We also consider that a very strong argument can be
advanced for its validity under the peace, order, and good government
(p.o.g.g.) power. However, we propose to deal first in this paper with
the criminal law power. It is the criminal law power which has hitherto
been regarded as the constitutional base of anti-combines legislation in
Canada, and so it seems desirable to first consider the line of cases which
has made that approach necessary. Our description of this line of cases
will also show that some parts of the Competition Bill are undoubtedly
valid as criminal law and that the remainder is arguably valid as criminal
law.
Our paper will then turn to the "trade and commerce" power, and
will show that this power, which was virtually suppressed by the Privy
Council under Lord Haldane, is now resuming its place as an important
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head of federal legislative power. It will be established that the weight of
authority now gives support for a confident argument that the Competition Bill would be upheld as a "regulation of trade and commerce" by
the present Supreme Court of Canada.
Then we shall consider the p.o.g.g. power, and we shall show that its
history closely parallels that of the trade and commerce power. After an
aberrant period when Lord Haldane dominated the Privy Council in
Canadian appeals, there has been a steady development of the p.o.g.g.
power to the point where it may now be available as support for any law
which "goes beyond local or provincial concern or interest and must
from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole".
We shall show that the Competition Bill probably satisfies that test.
The "Criminal Law" Power
History
The federal Parliament, under s. 91(27) of the B.N.A. Act, has the
power to enact "criminal law". This is the power which has hitherto
been relied upon as the primary constitutional support for Canada's
anti-combines legislation.
The first anti-combines statute was enacted by the federal Parliament
in 1889. It was intended to be a criminal law, and in 1892 the provisions
were transferred to the Criminal Code. Machinery for investigation and
for cease and desist orders was added in 1910. This statute-was not
challenged in the courts.
In 1919 a more ambitious regime of regulation was enacted by the
Combines and Fair Prices Act and the Board of Commerce Act. These
two statutes prohibited the hoarding of necessaries of life (which were
defined as staple foods, clothing and fuel), and they prohibited
profiteering in necessaries of life. A court of record called the Board of
Commerce was created with power to determine when a seller was
making an unfair profit from necessaries of life, and with power to issue
cease and desist orders which in effect enabled the Board to fix
maximum prices. In the Board of Commerce case (Re Board of
Commerce Act, 1919, and The Combines and FairPrices Act, 1919,
[1922] 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513), the Privy Council, speaking
through Viscount Haldane, held that the legislation was invalid. Much
more will be said about the Boardof Commerce case later in this paper,
but we might as well briefly explain the reasoning here: the p.o.g.g.
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power was of no avail because it was available only to meet emergency
conditions; the trade and commerce power was of no avail because it had
no independent content and could be invoked only as ancillary to other
federal powers; and the criminal law power was of no avail because it
was available only where "the subject matter is one which by its very
nature belongs to the domain of criminal jurisprudence." ( [1922] 1
A.C. 191, at pp. 198-9). Viscount Haldane's judgment in theBoardof
Commerce case is remarkable in that each of the three reasons given for
rejecting federal power has subsequently been expressly repudiated by
later decisions of the Privy Council, and is undoubtedly no longer part of
the constitutional law of Canada. It does not necessarily follow that the
result is wrong, but if the result is right it must be for reasons which are
not expressed in the judgment. So far as the p.o.g.g. power and the trade
and commerce power are concerned, these will be discussed later in this
paper. For the present, we shall consider the criminal law power.
Viscount Haldane's view that the criminal law power should be
confined to "the domain of criminal jurisprudence" appeared to
contemplate that there were historical bounds to the criminal law which
precluded the creation, if not of new crimes, at least of crimes which
were substantially different from those in existence in 1867. This view
cast doubt upon whether any anti-combines legislation could be
supported under the criminal power. But the federal Government
persevered. In 1923 the federal Parliament enacted a new Combines
Investigation Act. This Act repealed the two 1919 statutes, and replaced
them with a prohibition of certain anti-competitive "combines". The
new Act granted investigatory powers to a registrar and commissioners,
but these officials were not given the power to order the cessation of
anti-competitive activities. In the P.A.T.A. case (ProprietaryArticles
Trade Association v. A.-G. Can., [1931] A.C. 310, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 1),
the Privy Council, speaking through Lord Atkin, upheld the validity of
this 1923 legislation as criminal law. Lord Atkin said at p. 324 that it
was
...of little value to seek to confine crimes to a category of acts which by their very
nature belong to the domain of "criminal jurisprudence"; for the domain of
criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any
particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, and the only common
nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the State and that
those who commit them are punished.
Lord Atkin's definition of the criminal law as no more than a
prohibition coupled with a penalty arguably stated the position too

204

Canadian Business Law Journal

broadly. There has been no disposition in later judgments or commentary to revert to Viscount Haldane's domain of criminal jurisprudence,
but there have been suggestions that an element of moral opprobrium or
group welfare purpose should be added to the definition, so as to impose
some limitation on the federal Parliament's criminal law power. (For
discussion, see McDonald, "Constitutional Aspects of Canadian
Anti-Combines Law Enforcement", 47 Can. Bar Rev. 161 (1969), at
pp. 184-6; Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (1973), at
pp. 822-5). But the P.A .T.A. case placed beyond doubt that the criminal
law was capable of expansion into the world of commerce, and later
changes in the anti-combines laws have been premised on this broad
view of the criminal law.
The federal Parliament in 1935 enacted a new anti-combines statute,
which was upheld by the Privy Council under the criminal law and trade
and commerce powers inA.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can., [1937] A.C. 405,
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 702. In this case a tribunal power to approve certain
practices and relieve them from prosecution (advance clearance) had
been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada (Reference
re Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act, [1936] S.C.R. 379,
[1936] 3 D.L.R. 607); this part of the Supreme Court's decision was not
taken on appeal to the Privy Council, but the Privy Council reversed the
Supreme Court on some other points and it is possible that it would not
have upheld the Supreme Court on this one (McDonald, 47 Can. Bar
Rev. 161 (1969), at p. 179). Another statute enacted in 1935 was a
prohibition on price discrimination which was added to the Criminal
Code. This statute was upheld as valid criminal law by the Privy Council
inA.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can., [1937] A.C. 368, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 688,
affg [1936] S.C.R. 363, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 593. In 1951 the federal
Parliament prohibited resale price maintenance, and this was upheld as
valid criminal law by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Campbell
(1965), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 673n, affg 46 D.L.R. (2d) 83 (Ont. C.A.). In
1952 the federal Parliament authorized the courts to make orders
prohibiting the continuation of illegal practices, or dissolving an illegal
merger, in addition to imposing conventional criminal sanctions. The
constitutionality of a prohibition order was challenged in Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 303, 2
D.L.R. (2d) 11 and upheld as valid criminal law by the Supreme Court
of Canada.
It can be seen that there is abundant support for the statement by
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Laskin that "resort to the criminal law power to proscribe undesirable
commercial practices is today as characteristic of its exercise as has been
resort thereto to curb violence or immoral conduct" (Canadian
ConstitutionalLaw, 4th ed. (1973), at p. 824).
Competition Bill's new criminal offences
In the light of the history of the constitutional challenges to the
anti-combines laws, some parts of the Competition Bill can be
confidently accepted as valid criminal law. Any outright prohibitions of
trade practices are bound to be upheld as criminal law. Thus, the
extension of prohibitions to businesses not formerly subject to the
Combines Act, e.g., to the professions and to other providers of
services, is valid. The same conclusion follows with respect to the Bill's
extension of prohibitions to conduct not formerly specifically proscribed, e.g., implementation of foreign conspiracies (s. 32. 1), bid-rigging (s. 32.2), anti-competitive sports practices (s. 32.3), misleading
advertising (s. 36), misrepresentation of tests or testimonials (s. 36.1),
double ticketing (s. 36.2), pyramid selling (s. 36.3), referral selling
(s. 36.4), bait and switch selling (s. 37), sale above advertised price
(s. 37.1), improper contests (s. 37.2), resale price maintenance (s. 38).
Investigative powers to consider the laying of a criminal charge have
also consistently been upheld as valid criminal law, and provisions in
the new Bill which add to such powers are also clearly constitutional
(ss. 18, 20, 27).
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission's new powers
The Competition Bill does, however, contain a number of provisions
which cannot be confidently accepted as valid criminal law. The Bill
gives some new powers to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission.
In ss. 31.2 to 31.6 the Commission is empowered to inquire into the
question whether a particular adverse practice is occurring, and then to
make an order compelling particular parties to rectify the situation. This
goes beyond what has previously been upheld as criminal law because
(1) the inquiry by the Commission is not a preliminary step towards
criminal prosecution; (2) an order can be made without any prior
conviction for a criminal offence; and (3) if the provisions can be upheld
as within the criminal law power, they may have the effect of turning the
Commission into a court of criminal jurisdiction. These three points
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make the status as criminal law of these Commission powers questionable.
There has so far been no decided case in which a tribunal's regulatory
power (as opposed to investigatory power) has been characterized as
criminal law. And certainly in most contexts such a characterization
would be implausible. In the Competition Bill, however, it could be
argued that the Commission's powers are incidental to the criminal
offences in the Bill. In fact the practices over which the Commission is
given power have been stigmatized as contrary to the public interest in
various reports by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
(R.T.P.C. Report No. 1, Concerning the Manufacture, Distribution
and Sale of Ammunition in Canada (Ottawa 1959), (refusal to deal);
R.T.P.C. Report No. 9, Concerning the Production and Supply of
Newspapers in the City of Vancouver (Ottawa 1960) (tying of
newspaper advertisements); R.T.P.C. Report No. 18, On an Inquiry
into the Distribution and Sale of Automotive Oils etc. (Ottawa 1962)
(full-line forcing and directed buying) ). They are all practices which
either could be criminal themselves or could develop into criminal practices.
Would the Supreme Court of Canada be prepared to uphold the
Commission's new powers as criminal law? The Board of Commerce
case would be one roadblock, but that case's "domain of criminal
jurisprudence" reasoning may lead the Supreme Court to overrule it, or
ignore it, or distinguish it in one of the ways suggested later in this
paper. Another obstacle is the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of a
tribunal's advance clearance power in Reference re Dominion Trade
andIndustry Commission Act, supra, but, as we explained above, other
parts of that same decision were reversed by the Privy Council (A.-G.
Ont. v. A.-G. Can., supra), and the advance clearance point was not appealed.
More favourable to the validity as criminal law of the Commission's
regulatory powers is the broad statement of the criminal law power
which is to be found in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of CanadaLtd. v.
The Queen, supra. In that case, where it will be recalled the validity of a
prohibition order was in issue, Locke, J., in an opinion concurred in by
five other members of the court, said at p. 308 that:
The power to legislate in relation to criminal law is not restricted, in my opinion, to
defining offences and providing penalties for their commission. The power of
Parliament extends to legislation designed for the prevention of crime as well as to
punishing crime.
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This is interesting in that it shows that Locke, J., was not viewing the
power to make prohibition orders as merely an additional penalty for a
crime which had been committed, but rather as a measure directed to
prevent criminal activity in the future. If indeed "prevention" is on the
same basis as "cure" (as Viscount Simon said inA.-G. Ont. v. Canada
Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at p. 207, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 1,
quoted by Locke, J., at p. 309), then one could make an argument that
the fact that the Commission's regulatory powers are designed to
prevent conduct which either would be criminal or could develop into
criminal conduct is sufficient to uphold the powers as criminal law.
We consider that the argument for treating the Commission's
regulatory powers as criminal is merely a subsidiary argument. The
principal argument for their validity is not that they are valid under the
criminal law power, but that they are valid under the trade and
commerce power and the p.o.g.g. power. We explain later why we
consider that trade and commerce and p.o.g.g. are the more appropriate
classifications. If we are correct in our view of the scope of trade and
commerce and p.o.g.g., then there will be no need to classify the
Commission's powers as criminal, and no need to regard the Commission as a court of criminal jurisdiction. If, however, the Supreme Court
did unexpectedly decide to revive the old narrow conceptions of trade
and commerce and p.o.g.g. which we believe are now dead, then as a
compensatory measure it would probably be willing to concede a broad
scope to the criminal law power. This is in effect what happened in the
Privy Council,,where the narrowing of trade and commerce and p.o.g.g.
led to a broadening of criminal law. If (contrary to our opinion) this is to
be the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada, then there is an
argument in favour of sustaining the Commission's powers as valid
criminal law.
Civil cause of action
Section 31. 1 affords a civil remedy in damages to a person who has
suffered loss or damage as a result of either "conduct that is contrary to
any provision of Part V" (the criminal offences of the Act), or "the
failure of any person to comply with an order of the Commission or a
court under this Act". Obviously, if, as we argue later, the Competition
Bill can be sustained under the trade and commerce power or the
p.o.g.g. power, there could be no serious challenge to the creation of a
civil cause of action in the statute. It is only the criminal law power
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which by its very nature contemplates primarily public rather than
private enforcement. There is no reason to suppose that the Parliament's
other heads of power place any limits on the mode of enforcement which
Parliament may adopt, for example, the industrial property statutes
clearly envisage civil actions. In our view this is probably the short and
conclusive answer to the validity of the civil remedy.
However, if (contrary to our view) the Bill can be sustained only
under the criminal law power, the validity of the civil remedy would
have to stand or fall as a criminal law. The courts have been ready to
accept as valid "criminal law" a wide range of penalties for breach of a
statute, and it is likely that restitution of property or compensation for
loss to the victim would be valid (Laskin, CanadianConstitutionalLaw,
4th ed. (1973), at p. 836; Re Torek and The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R.
(3d) 417, 2 0.R. (2d) 228 (H.C.J.) ). But s. 31.1 goes further than this
in that it contemplates a separate civil action for damages, and thus an
award of damages outside the criminal process altogether. There is not
even a requirement that the defendant has been convicted of the criminal
offence which is alleged to have caused the loss. The plaintiff would
simply prove the facts relied upon in his civil suit.
The question whether the federal Parliament has the competence to
confer a separate civil right of action for breach of a criminal statute has
been the subject of conflicting judicial dicta. In two cases plaintiffs have
sued for damages for breach of the anti-combines laws. In each case the
plaintiff lost on the basis of statutory interpretation: the legislation was
interpreted as not purporting to confer a civil right of action. In the first
case there are obiterdicta in the Ontario Court of Appeal which suggest
that the federal Parliament would in any case have no constitutional
power to confer a civil right of action for breach of a criminal statute
(TransportOil Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. and CitiesService Oil Co. Ltd.,
[1935] O.R. 215 at p. 219, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 500per Middleton, J.A.).
But in the second case the Supreme Court of Canada doubted the
correctness of the Transport Oil dicta (Direct Lumber Co. Ltd. v.
Western Plywood Co. Ltd., [1962] S.C.R. 646 at pp. 649-50, 35
D.L.R. (2d) I per Judson, J.). Laskin, (CanadianConstitutionalLaw,
4th ed. (1973), at pp. 832-8) reports this difference of opinion, and
some related controversies, but does not take sides himself. McDonald,
("Constitutional Aspects of Canadian Anti-Combines Law Enforcement", supra, at p. 228) takes the view that the federal Parliament does
have the power, as an incident to its criminal law power, to add a civil
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cause of action to a criminal statute. This is probably the better view, on
the basis both of the weight of authority and upon the expansive
approach of the courts to the criminal law power. We conclude,
therefore, that the civil cause of action can probably be upheld as
incidental to a valid criminal law.
We must repeat, however, that any doubt about the validity of the new
civil cause of action disappears altogether if the Competition Bill is
supported under the trade and commerce power or the p.o.g.g. power:
the civil action is clearly valid under either of those heads.
Powers of federal court
Under s. 29.1 of the Competition Bill "a court" has jurisdiction to
issue an interim injunction to prohibit the commission of an offence
pending prosecution of the offender. The term "court" is defined in
s. 29.1(8) as meaning "the Federal Court of Canada or a superior court
of criminal jurisdiction as defined in the Criminal Code". This power to
issue an injunction is almost certainly valid, even as criminal law, since
it is specifically addressed to the commission of criminal offences
during the period prior to prosecution and conviction. But the question
arises: is investment of jurisdiction in the Federal Court of Canada
valid?
Under s. 46 the Federal Court of Canada is given jurisdiction to try
criminal offences created by the new Bill. Is this valid?
It will be recalled that a similar question was raised, but not answered,
in the discussion of the Commission's new powers - on the assumption
(which we believe to be incorrect) that those powers can only be upheld
as criminal law.
What is involved in the previous paragraphs is the question whether
the federal Parliament has the power to invest with criminal jurisdiction
a court of its own creation. The reason why this is unclear is that the
B.N.A. Act, by s. 91(27), confers on the federal Parliament the power
to make laws in relation to "the criminal law, except the constitution of
courts of criminaljurisdiction, but including the procedure in criminal
matters". What is contemplated by s. 91(27) is that the federal
Parliament will enact the substantive and procedural criminal law, but
will vest jurisdiction in provincially-established courts. The provincial
Legislatures, by s. 92(14), are given power to make laws in relation to
"the administration of justice in the province, including the constitu-
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tion, maintenance, and organization of provincial courts, both of civil
and of criminaljurisdiction . . . ".

The federal Parliament does however have power to create federal
courts under s. 101 of the B.N.A. Act. Section 101 authorizes the
constitution of (1) "a general court of appeal for Canada", and (2) "any
additional courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada". It
is the latter branch of this section which provided the constitutional
power for the establishment of the Exchequer Court in 1875, and of the
Federal Court of Canada in 1972. It is arguable that s. 101 authorizes the
constitution of a federal court of criminal jurisdiction, because s. 101 is
expressed to apply "notwithstanding anything in this Act". The
notwithstanding clause is arguably sufficient to overcome the exclusion
from s. 91(27) of "the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction".
On the other hand, it is possible for the courts to "read down" the
notwithstanding clause in s. 101 as not overriding the more specific
exclusion in s. 91(27), especially as s. 91 itself includes a notwithstanding clause. There is no decided case on point, and commentators are
disagreed. McDonald (47 Can. Bar Rev. 161 (1969), at pp. 220-5)
favours the narrower view, while Laskin (Canadian Constitutional
Law, (4th ed. (1973), at p. 793; compare 3rd ed. rev. (1969), at p. 818
(same proposition) ) favours the broader view that the federal Parliament does have the power to constitute a court of criminal jurisdiction.
The issue is complex, and we do not wish to embark in this short paper
on the extended argumentation which it justifies, but we have concluded
that the investment of criminal jurisdiction in the Federal Court of
Canada is probably valid. It is worth pointing out that this issue would
not be by-passed by a holding that the Bill is valid as an exercise of the
trade and commerce power or the p.o.g.g. power. Such a holding would
not alter the facts that there are criminal offences in the Bill, that the
jurisdiction to try those offences is a criminal jurisdiction, and that it has
been invested in a federal court. With respect to the powers of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, the issue would be by-passed
by the Bill being upheld as an exercise of the trade and commerce power
or the p.o.g.g. power, because then the Commission's powers would be
properly classifiable as non-criminal.
The "Trade and Commerce" Power
Early interpretation
The federal Parliament, under s. 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act, has the
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power to make laws in relation to "the regulation of trade and commerce. "
Despite the breadth of this language, the Privy Council severely
confined the trade and commerce power. Their lordships held that it did
not authorize the regulation of intraprovincial transactions because these
were matters of "property and civil rights in the province", within
provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(13). In Citizens Insurance Co. v.
Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, the Privy Council held that the
provinces had the power to regulate the terms and conditions of
insurance policies. The federal Parliament's trade and commerce power
did not "comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts
of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in
a single province". What the trade and commerce power would
comprehend was (1) interprovincial and international trade, and, (2)
"general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion".
The CitizensInsurance definition of the trade and commerce power is
still frequently cited as authoritative. But of course its two categories are
very vague, and there have been many vicissitudes in their application
by the courts. Without going into detail, it is generally accurate to assert
that the Privy Council during the period when it was dominated by Lord
Haldane (1912 to 1928 was Lord Haldane's tenure) gave both categories
a very narrow scope. The nadir of the power came in the Board of
Commerce case, a case which has already been discussed in this paper
(pp. 202-3 above), in which the Privy Council, speaking through Lord
Haldane, struck down the Combines and Fair Prices Act, which was
the anti-combines legislation that comes closest to our present Competition Bill. In that case, Lord Haldane suggested in argument that the
trade and commerce power had no independent content and could be
invoked only as ancillary to other federal powers. In the judgment itself the trade and commerce power was rejected in one uninformative
sentence (p. 198): s. 91(2) "did not, by itself, enable interference with
particular trades in which Canadians would .. .be free to engage in

the Provinces".
No attempt was made by the Privy Council to resurrect the trade and
commerce power until after Lord Haldane died in 1928. In 1929 the
P.A.T.A. case, which has already been discussed in this paper (p. 203
above), came before the courts. It will be recalled that in this case the
Combines Investigation Act was upheld as an exercise of the criminal
law power. However, the Privy Council, now speaking through Lord
Atkin, in an obiter dictum specifically rejected Lord Haldane's notion
that the trade and commerce power could only be used in furtherance of
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a power that Parliament possessed independently of it. Lord Atkin said
at p. 326 that the words of the trade and commerce power "must receive
their proper construction where they stand as giving independent
authority to Parliament over the particular subject-matter", and he
explicitly stated that their Lordships were leaving open the question
whether the Combines Investigation Act could be sustained under the
trade and commerce power as well as under the criminal law power.
In 1936 another reference was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada
relating to one of the anti-combines laws, namely, a federal statute
providing that persons in any of certain specific industries could enter
into rationalization agreements after approval by the Governor-inCouncil on the advice of a Commission: Reference re Dominion Trade
and Industry Commission Act, [1936] S.C.R. 379, [1936] 3 D.L.R.
607. Chief Justice Duff wrote the judgment for a unanimous court and
held the legislation ultra vires. In so doing he stated at p. 382:
If confined to external trade and interprovincial trade, the section might well be

competent under head no. 2 of section 91; and if the legislation were in substance
concerned with such trade, incidental legislation in relation to local trade necessary

in order to prevent the defeat of the competent provisions might also be competent . ..

While there was no appeal to the Privy Council on this particular part of
the statute, the other sections which were struck down by the Supreme
Court were upheld in the Privy Council, A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can.,
[1937] A.C. 405, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702. Specifically the Board held that
the trade and commerce power would uphold the creation and regulation
of a uniform law of trade marks. Thus, by 1937, it was clear that the
"general" trade and commerce power gave some power of uncertain
scope to establish uniform laws across Canada in the economic sphere
even if those laws affected property and civil rights.
Since the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949 there has
been a steady expansion of the trade and commerce power. In order to
understand the nature and extent of this expansion it seems desirable to
look briefly at the cases dealing with the "interprovincial" (and
international) trade and commerce power, and then at the cases dealing
with the "general" trade and commerce power.
Interprovincial trade and commerce
In a series of marketing cases before the abolition of appeals to the
Privy Council, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada were
so strict in their holdings that the trade and commerce power could not
extend to intraprovincial trade that they virtually destroyed the effective
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federal power to regulate marketing. In The King v. Eastern Terminal
Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1, the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down a federal statute which regulated the grain
trade. As is common knowledge (and was recognized by the Judges in
the case), very little of Canada's grain is actually consumed in the
province of production, and the great bulk of it is exported. Nevertheless, the federal statute had to fasten onto some local operations, and in
particular to license and regulate grain elevators, in order to make the
scheme effective. The court held that the regulation of local works such
as elevators made the scheme invalid. Similarly, in the Natural
ProductsMarketing case (A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can., [1937] A.C. 377,
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 691), a statute was held invalid which provided for the
establishment of marketing schemes for natural products whose
principal market was outside the province of production, or which had a
partly export market. The Privy Council held the statute invalid because
it included within its purview some transactions which could be
completed within the province.
The reversal of the Privy Council's anti-federal tendency was
discernible in the OntarioFarm ProductsReference (Reference re The
FarmProductsMarketingAct, [1957] S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257),
a case concerning a provincial statute in which four Judges indicated by
implication that federal power would extend to some transactions which
were completed within a province. InR. v. Klassen (1959), 20 D.L.R.
(2d) 406, 31 C.R. 275, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that a federal
marketing statute, designed to regulate the interprovincial and export
trade in grain, could as an incident of that regulation impose a quota
system on a local feed mill the operations of which were exclusively
intraprovincial. This decision appears to be inconsistent with the
Eastern Terminal Elevator and the NaturalProducts Marketing cases.
And yet the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal. The new
development suggested by the refusal of leave to appeal in Klassen was
confirmed in Caloillnc. v. A.-G. Can., [1971] S.C.R. 543, 20 D.L.R.
(3d) 472, when the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld a
federal prohibition on the transportation or sale of imported oil west of
the Ottawa valley. The purpose was to protect the domestic industry
from the then cheaper imported product. This prohibition clearly caught
many transactions which would otherwise have been completed within a
province. Yet it was upheld as "an incident in the administration of an
extraprovincial marketing scheme."
Also favourable to federal power are two recent cases in which
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provincial marketing plans were held to be unconstitutional on the
ground that they were in relation to the federal subject-matter of trade
and commerce. The ManitobaEgg Reference (A.-G. Man. v. Manitoba
Egg and PoultryAssociation, [1971] S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169)

decided that Manitoba's egg marketing plan, which applied to all eggs in
Manitoba, whether produced in Manitoba or imported into Manitoba,
was invalid. The primary purpose of the legislation was to protect
Manitoba producers, and the efficacy of that object required that
imported eggs be controlled on the same basis as domestic Manitoba
eggs. The Supreme Court of Canada denied that there was any factual
basis for a finding that the legislation was intended to discriminate
against out-of-province producers; yet they held that the plan was
"designed to restrict or limit the free flow of trade between provinces as
such", and because of that was "an invasion of the exclusive legislative
authority of the Parliament of Canada over the matter of the regulation of
trade and commerce" ( [1971] S.C.R. 689 at p. 703 per Martland, J.;
Laskin, J., at p. 717 is to the same effect). Notice how sweeping this
decision is: it does not declare the Manitoba plan invalid only in respect
of out-of-province eggs; it declares the entire plan invalid, even though
the overwhelming majority of its applications would be to eggs
produced in the province. Once again, we see the theory that an
interprovincial flow of trade carries even local transactions into the
federal trade and commerce power.
A similar approach is evident in the most recent marketing case in the
Supreme Court of Canada, namely, Burns Foods Ltd. v. A.-G. Man.

(1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 731, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 494. In that case what was
in issue was not an entire provincial marketing plan (as in the Egg
reference), but an order of the Manitoba Hog Producers' Marketing
Board prohibiting Manitoba hog packers from slaughtering hogs in
Manitoba unless the hogs had been purchased from the Marketing
Board. The order was made in order to stop Manitoba packers from
buying hogs directly from producers in Saskatchewan and thereby
by-passing the Hog Producers' Marketing Plan, which required all hogs
to be purchased through an auction conducted by the Board. The
purpose of the impugned order was to subject hogs from outside the
province to exactly the same rules as hogs from within the province. The
Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of six to one, held that the order
was unconstitutional. According to Pigeon, J., for the majority at
p. 737, "the direct regulation of interprovincial trade is of itself a matter
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outside the legislative authority of any Province and it cannot be treated
as accessory of the local trade."
Manitoba Egg and Burns Foods do take a very restrictive view of the
provincial power to create an effective marketing scheme under the
authority of "property and civil rights in the Province". By the same
token, they implicitly accept a broader view of the federal "trade and
commerce" power, for whatever is withheld from property and civil
rights on the grounds of its extraprovincial effects must be within the
trade and commerce power. When these cases are read with Caloil it
becomes clear that the old Privy Council cases on the trade and
commerce power are no longer reliable guides to the prediction of the
decisions of the present Supreme Court of Canada under the interprovincial trade and commerce power.
General trade and commerce
There has not been a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
defining the "general" trade and commerce power. However, there is
an important decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which has been
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The case is Vapor Canada
Ltd. v. MacDonald (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 434, [1972] F.C. 1156. In
issue is the validity of s. 7 of the Trade Marks Act which relates to
passing off and other like trade practices. Paragraph (e) of subsec. 7(1)
states that "No person shall . . . do any . . . act or adopt
any . ..business practice contrary to honest industrial .. .usage in

Canada". Chief Justice Jackett, for the Federal Court of Appeal, held
that the whole section, including this paragraph, was valid federal
legislation under the general trade and commerce power. He characterized the Act as "a law of general application regulating standards of
business conduct in Canada" (p. 449), and concluded that such a law
was one for the general regulation of trade affecting the whole country
(p. 447).
At the time of writing (December, 1975) the appeal in Vapor has been
argued in the Supreme Court of Canada, but the Supreme Court has not
yet rendered a decision. Obviously, if the position of the Federal Court
of Appeal is upheld, it will constitute a more dramatic development of
the trade and commerce power than the Competition Bill would re2
quire.
2 See Addendum to this article at p. 227.
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Writing about the trade and commerce power in 1963, in a foreword
to Smith's book on The Commerce Power in Canada and the United
States (1963), Ivan Rand said:
The development of this Dominion power with its vital interest for every part of the
country, has been unrealistic and inadequate. In the result, the effective
management of the economy as a whole in terms of political and legislative action,
of the necessity for which we are now daily witnesses, is shown to have become
trammelled to an extent which forces us to contemplate a degree of fresh appraisal
of the limitations to which the Dominion has been reduced.

The recent decisions, particularly Caloil, Manitoba Egg, Burns and
Vapor suggest that a fresh appraisal is upon us.
Application to Competition Bill
Relating the current state of the trade and commerce power to the
Competition Bill, it is clear that it is the "general" trade and commerce
power which provides the most obvious support for the Bill. Here we
have a law which aims at the "general regulation of trade affecting the
whole Dominion" (to quote from the well-known Citizens Insurance
dictum). But the "interprovincial" trade and commerce power is also
equally plausible, for, as explained above, the Competition Bill is
designed to facilitate the flow of resources and products throughout the
nation without regard for provincial boundaries.
We have no doubt that services are within the term "trade and
commerce", although this point appears never to have been decided in
Canada, presumably because the federal Parliament has not hitherto
attempted to regulate the service industries. There were some suggestions in the early insurance cases that the insurance business was not a
"trade", but the cases were not decided on that ground, and, as Laskin
comments, no consideration was given to the question whether
insurance was "commerce" (Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law,
4th ed. (1973), at p. 346). In the United States it was initially thought
that the insurance business was not within the interstate commerce
power of the federal Government, but in 1943 that position was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court (U.S. v. South Eastern Underwriters Association (1943), 332 U.S. 574) and it is now firmly
established that all services are included within the reach of the Sherman
Act, the constitutional validity of which rests on the word "commerce"
alone. The authorities are conveniently gathered in the recent decision in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975), 95 S. Ct. 2004, in which the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the adoption of a minimum
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fee schedule by the lawyers who were members of the Fairfax County
Bar Association in Virginia constituted price-fixing in violation of the
Sherman Act. The supply of services - even by a learned profession was commerce. In Canada, where the constitutional authority is based
on "trade and commerce", rather than just "commerce", it is unlikely
that any different result would be reached. Suppliers of services have
always been described as people carrying on a trade. Indeed it would be
strange if the Competition Bill, which has its common law genesis in the
Dyers case (1415), Y.B. 2 Hen. V, Vol. 5, pl. 26, (a case involving a
restraint in a service industry) were to be restricted so as not to include
the service industries. Service industries are now a large part of the total
business in the country (see the Economic Council of Canada Interim
Report on Competition Policy, (1969) Chapter VII), and the flow of
services is not confined within provincial boundaries.
The procedural changes introduced by the new Bill, including the
new civil action for damages, do not give rise to constitutional
difficulty. As was mentioned in the discussion of the civil cause of
action under the criminal law power, outside the realm of criminal law
there is no suggestion in the cases that would limit the range of
procedures and remedies which the Parliament may employ to enforce
otherwise valid legislation.
The new powers of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission are
also valid for exactly the same reason. These powers are the means
selected by Parliament to carry out part of its otherwise valid regime of
,competition policy.
The only part of the Competition Bill that does not easily fit into the
general scheme of competition policy is the part dealing with consumer
protection measures. While these provisions are all prohibitory in nature
and are clearly valid under the criminal law power they also could be
supported under the "general" trade and commerce power. Honest
market legislation, even at the consumer level, is necessary to the proper
working of the free enterprise system.
We believe that the case law after Lord Haldane',s death in 1928 is
uniformly consistent with our conclusions. Indeed, as noticed earlier,
in the P.A.T.A. case, [1931] A.C. 310, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 1, while the
Privy Council upheld the Combines Investigation Act on the basis of
the criminal law power, Lord Atkin went out of his way to say (at p.
326) that their lordships desired to guard themselves from being supposed to lay down that the statute could not be supported under the
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trade and commerce power. This statement of Lord Atkin was referred
S.C.R. 303 at p. 308, 2 D.L.R. (2d) 11, although again the court
found it unnecessary to consider the trade and commerce power because it held that the authority of the federal Parliament under the criminal law power was sufficient. Thus there are some judicial dicta supporting the existing Combines Investigation Act under the trade and
commerce power. With the extensive amendments proposed by the
Competition Bill it would be simpler and more direct to support the
statute under that power.
The one real difficulty in the case law is of course the Board of
Commerce case, dating from the Haldane period. The legislation in the
Board of Commerce case, while entirely dissimilar in point of detail, is
similar to the Competition Bill in its ends and means. Our view of the
Board of Commerce case is that it was wrongly decided. As we have
pointed out, each of the reasons given by Lord Haldane for rejecting the
legislation there in issue has subsequently been expressly repudiated. In
the light of later cases we believe that the legislation there in issue should
have been upheld as an exercise of the trade and commerce power, and
perhaps also as an exercise of the peace, order, and good government
power (to be discussed next). We are confident that the Supreme Court
of Canada would not regard itself as inflexibly bound to follow all of the
decisions of the Privy Council in Canadian constitutional appeals.
Accordingly, we believe that it would be proper to argue before the
Supreme Court of Canada that the Board of Commerce case should not
be followed, and that the court might be willing to take that step.
In case the Supreme Court of Canada were not prepared to go so far as
to overrule or, more accurately, refuse to follow the Boardof Commerce
case, there are several bases upon which the Board of Commerce case
could be distinguished. First, the Board of Commerce legislation was
narrower in scope than the Competition Bill, because the former was
applicable only to a limited class of products, namely "necessaries of
life". Therefore, as Duff, C.J.C., commented in Reference re Alberta
Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, (quoted above), the
Board of Commerce legislation was much closer to "the regulation of
the contracts of a particular business or trade" which the older cases
consistently held to be outside the federal trade and commerce power.
The Competition Bill, by contrast, applies to every trade. Secondly, as
Lord Atkin commented in the P.A. T.A. case, supra, at p. 325 the Board
of Commerce legislation gave exceptionally broad powers to the Board
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of Commerce, going so far as to permit the Board "to inquire into
individual cases without applying any principles of general application." The Competition Bill defines the new powers of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission as specifically as the circumstances
permit, and it therefore regulates by the use of rules (or principles) of
general application. A third distinction may be found, not in the
legislation itself, but in the social and economic environment. The
Board of Commerce case was decided at the end of the first world war.
At that time trade was more local than it is now. Improvements in
transport and communications, the growth of concentrated business
enterprises organized on a national or multi-national basis, the increase
in the number of international agreements relating to trade and
commerce, and the general increase in personal mobility have transformed the Canadian economy since the first world war. The Supreme
Court of Canada, interpreting the B.N.A. Act as a living tree capable of
growth and adaptation, might well be willing to regard the modem
social and economic environment as sufficiently different to justify
giving the Competition Bill a different constitutional classification from
the Board of Commerce legislation.
The "Peace, Order, and Good Government" (P.O.G.G.) Power
Early interpretation
The opening words of s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act give to the federal
Parliament power "to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
of the Provinces".
It is well known that during the period when Lord Haldane dominated
the Privy Council in its Canadian appeals, the Privy Council narrowed
the scope of the p.o.g.g. power until it seemed to be available as a
regulatory power only in emergencies such as war. Their lordships held
that the power could not support an insurance statute, A.-G. Can. v.
A.-G. Alta., [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 26 D.L.R. 288; a combines and fair
prices statute, Boardof Commerce, [1922] A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513; a
labour relations statute, Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider,
[1925] A.C. 396, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5; an unemployment insurance
statute, A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 355, [1937] 1 D.L.R.
684; minimum wage and hours of labour statutes, A.-G. Can. v. A.-G.
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Ont., [1937] A.C. 326, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673; and a natural products
marketing statute,A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can., [1937] A.C. 377, [1937] 1
D.L.R. 691. Even the depression of the 1930's was deemed by the Privy
Council of this period to be an insufficient "emergency" to enable the
federal Parliament to use the p.o.g.g. power as a basis of economic
regulation. Only the first world war was deemed sufficient, Fort
Frances Pulp and Power Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Ltd.,
[1923] A.C. 695, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 629; though not the economic
dislocation which followed it, Board of Commerce case, supra.
Lord Haldane's "emergency" doctrine always suffered from two
grave difficulties. The first, and most serious, was that it was a highly
implausible reading of the B.N.A. Act, because the structure of s. 91
makes clear the the p.o.g.g. power is the primary grant of power to the
federal Parliament. The enumerated heads of power in s. 91 are listed
merely as examples of the peace, order, and good government power; as
s. 91 expressly states, the enumerated heads are listed "for greater
certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms of
this section" - the "foregoing terms" being the p.o.g.g. power. The
result of the Haldane construction was to elevate the enumerated heads
to the status of an exhaustive list of federal powers, and to reduce the
p.o.g.g. power to a further enumerated head called "emergency
conditions" or some similar phrase. Such a construction was simply
contrary to the express language of s. 91.
The second difficulty with the "emergency" doctrine was Russell v.
The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, a case decided by the Privy Council
before Lord Haldane's time. In that case the Privy Council, speaking
through Sir Montague E. Smith, held that the p.o.g.g. power was
capable of sustaining the Canada Temperance Act, a federal statute
which regulated the sale and consumption of liquor on a local option
basis. This statute affected property and civil rights in the province,
because "the free use of things in which men may have property is
interfered with", but "that incidental interference does not alter the
character of the law" (p. 839). Actually, their lordships did not commit
themselves as to whether the Canada Temperance Act was a matter
within p.o.g.g. or trade and commerce, though they clearly leaned
towards p.o.g.g. In the Local Prohibition case (A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G.
Can., [1896] A.C. 348), however, the Privy Council, speaking through
Lord Watson, held that the Russell case was based on the p.o.g.g.
power; and Lord Watson defined p.o.g.g. in terms which did not rely
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such matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance,
and ought not to trench upon provincial legislation with respect to any of
the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92" (p. 360). The inconsistency between Russell and the emergency doctrine was so obvious that it
evidently troubled Lord Haldane himself, leading him in Toronto
ElectricCommissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 at p. 412, [1925] 2
D.L.R. 5, to "explain" Russell upon the ground
.. . that the evil of intemperance at that time amounted in Canada to one so great
and so general that at least for the period it was a menace to the national life of
Canada so serious and pressing that the National Parliament was called on to
intervene to protect the nation from disaster.

Recent interpretation
InA.-G. Ont. v. CanadaTemperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193,
[1946] 2 D.L.R. 1, a new attack was made upon the Canada
Temperance Act, on the basis either that Russell was wrongly decided
and should be overruled, or that the emergency which (according to
Lord Haldane) had been created by the evil of intemperance had now
disappeared. The Privy Council, now speaking through Viscount
Simon, refused to overrule Russell and described Lord Haldane's
"explanation" of Russell as "too narrowly expressed" (p. 206). Then,
in an amazing turnabout, their lordships rejected the emergency doctrine
altogether, at p. 205:
In their Lordships' opinion, the true test must be found in the real subject matter of
the legislation: if it is such that it goes beyond local or provincial concern or
interests and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a
whole . . . then it will fall within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a
matter affecting the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it may in
another aspect touch upon matters specially reserved to the provincial legislatures.

Legislation which satisfied this test could be called for by an emergency,
such as "war" or "pestilence", but it could also be unrelated to an
emergency, such as "the drink or drug traffic, or the carrying of arms"
(pp. 205-6); " . . . it is the nature of the legislation itself, and not the

existence of emergency, that must determine whether it is valid or not"
(p. 206). The Privy Council's decision was, therefore, that the Canada
Temperance Act was valid.
After the Canada Temperance Federation case the Privy Council
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reiterated the emergency doctrine several times, either without reference to the Canada Temperance Federation case (Co-operative
Committee on JapaneseCanadians v. A.-G. Can., [1947] A.C. 87, at
p. 101, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 per Lord Wright; Canadian Pacific
Railway Co. v. A.-G. B.C., [1950] A.C. 122 at pp. 140-1, [1950] 1
D.L.R. 721 per Lord Reid), or with a disapproving reference to the
CanadaTemperance Federationcase (CanadianFederationofAgriculture v. A.-G. Que., [1951]A.C. 179 atpp. 197-8, [195014D.L.R. 689
per Lord Morton of Henryton). When appeals to the Privy Council
ended in 1949 (i.e., for cases commenced after 1949), the position was
thoroughly confused. Was the emergency doctrine still good law, as
these cases suggested, or was it now bad law, as Canada Temperance
Federationhad distinctly decided?
Since the abolition of appeals the Canadian courts have invariably and
unhesitatingly chosen to apply the CanadaTemperance Federationtest,
and to ignore the emergency doctrine. In Johannesson v. West St. Paul,
[1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609, the Supreme Court of
Canada confirmed that aeronautics was a matter within federal
legislative competence under p.o.g.g. This was a unanimous decision
by the court, and of the five opinions written all but one relied upon the
language of the Canada Temperance Federationcase to support federal
legislative power. (The fifth opinion, that of Estey, J., was not
inconsistent with the others, but Estey, J., assumed that the issue was
settled in the Dominion's favour by the Aeronautics case (Re The
Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54,
[1932] 1 D.L.R. 58) ). For decisions that atomic energy and pollution
are also within p. o.g.g. under the CanadaTemperance Federationtest,
see Pronto Uranium Mines v. OntarioLabourRelations Board, [ 1956]
O.R. 862, 5 D.L.R. (2d) 342 (McLennan, J.); Denison Mines Ltd. v.
A.-G. Can., [1973] 1 O.R. 797, 32 D.L.R. (3d) 419 (H.C.J.)
(Donnelly, J.);R. v. Lake Ontario Cement Ltd., [1973] 2 O.R. 247, 35
D.L.R. (3d) 109 (H.C.J.) (O'Driscoll, J.).
In Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57
D.L.R. (2d) 753, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the validity of
the National Capital Act, a federal statute which established a national
capital region consisting of an area comprising the part of Ontario and
Quebec including and surrounding Ottawa. This Act created an agency
called the National Capital Commission, and vested in the Commission
certain planning powers, including the power to expropriate land. An
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expropriation of land led to a challenge to the statute. In upholding the
statute Cartwright, J., who wrote for a unanimous court, quoted with
approval the Canada Temperance Federation test, and said that he
found it "difficult to suggest a subject matter of legislation which more
clearly goes beyond local or provincial interests and is the concern of
Canada as a whole than the development, conservation and improvement of the National Capital Region ....
" (p. 671).
InRe Offshore Minerals of B.C., [1967] S.C.R. 792, 65 D.L.R. (2d)
353, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal Parliament had
authority to make laws in relation to the mineral resources of the lands
underlying the territorial sea off the coast of British Columbia. The
authority came either from s. 91(1A) (public debt and property), or
from "the residual power in s. 91". So far as the latter was concerned,
"the mineral resources of the lands underlying the territorial sea are of
concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond local or provincial
concerns or interests" (p. 817). Although the Canada Temperance
Federation case was not cited, that of course is where the language
comes from.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the
p.o.g.g. power is Jones v. A.-G. Can. (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 583,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 182 in which it was held that the federal Official
Languages Act was valid. This Act, confined as it is to the institutions of
the Parliament and Government of Canada, and to federal courts and
courts of criminal jurisdiction, could have been upheld under the various
powers by which those institutions are created or invested with
jurisdiction. A court which was unwilling to make use of the p.o.g.g.
power would presumably have followed this route. But Laskin, C.J.C.,
writing for a unanimous court of all nine members, chose instead to
uphold the Act as a law in relation to p.o.g.g. He did not offer any
definition of p.o.g.g., but said that he was relying on its "residuary
character" (p. 589).
Once a statute is characterized as in relation to p.o.g.g. (or any other
head of federal power) it is no objection to its validity that it regulates
contracts or property or other subject-matters which would otherwise be
within provincial jurisdiction. The zoning of land and the expropriation
of land are matters of "property and civil rights in the province" which
would normally be within exclusive provincial jurisdiction, but a federal
statute in relation to aeronautics (Johannesson) or the national capital
region (Munro) may validly impose zoning requirements or expropriate
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land, because aeronautics and the national capital region are matters
within the peace, order, and good government of Canada. It is clear,
therefore, that, if the regulation of competition is held to be a matter
within p.o.g.g. (or trade and commerce), then federal power will extend
to the kind of detailed regulation of contracts, property rights and other
matters which would normally be within "property and civil rights"
which is contemplated by the Competition Bill.
The Canada Temperance definition may now be safely accepted as
the law of Canada. However, it is exceedingly vague, and the cases have
made no attempt to elaborate more precise rules. In Canada Temperance itself, and in Johannesson, Pronto, Munro, Offshore Mineral
Rights, Lake Ontario Cement and Denison Mines the courts simply
asserted that the subject-matter in issue satisfied the Canada Temperance test. Since the courts have never since the abolition of appeals
rejected an assertion of federal legislative competence seriously based
upon the p.o.g.g. power, they have never been forced to spell out what
are the limits of that power. Nor have the courts so far found it necessary
to comment on the authority of the Privy Council cases which were
decided on the basis of the now discredited emergency doctrine. We
believe that it is possible that some of these cases will not be followed by
the Supreme Court of Canada. We have earlier explained that we believe
that the Board of Commerce case might be overruled. But, at the very
least, it can be asserted with some confidence that the court will not be
eager to extend to new facts a decision such as Board of Commerce
whose reasoning depends upon an "emergency" interpretation of
p.o.g.g. and an" ancillary" interpretation of trade and commerce. If the
Competition Bill is attacked solely on the basis of Boardof Commerce
and the other inter-war Privy Council decisions, then the attack is a weak
one.
Application to Competition Bill
There are strong positive reasons for asserting that the Competition
Bill satisfies the CanadaTemperance Federationtest, i.e., that it "goes
beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must from its
inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole". We have
already explained that Canada is one marketplace with goods, services,
cash and credit flowing freely without regard for provincial boundaries.
No competition policy could be effective in the ordering of the economy
of Canada as a whole if it could not embrace the entire marketplace. In
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this respect its national dimensions are similar to those of radio or
aeronautics, and, while less similar, arguably as clear as those of the
liquor trade, atomic energy, pollution, the national capital region and
official languages.
Conclusions
Our conclusion is that the Competition Bill is within the legislative
powers of the federal Parliament. There are three constitutional powers
to be considered.
(1) Trade and commerce
The strongest argument for the validity of the Competition Bill, in our
view, would be based on the "trade and commerce" power (B.N.A.
Act, s. 91(2) ). The Bill is designed to regulate indirectly the economy
of the whole country by ensuring competitive markets for Canadian
goods and services. The policy is to promote the most efficient
allocation of Canada's resources of people and materials by removing
artificial impediments to the free flow of resources to those sectors of the
economy where they can be best utilized. But Canada is one economy,
not ten economies: the flow of resources occurs now, and should occur
in the future, without regard for provincial boundaries. The regulation
of this flow by competition policy (or any other policy) cannot be
accomplished by any one province, or even by all provinces acting in
concert. The provinces do not have the constitutional power to do so,
and if they did the territorial limits to their competence would doom their
efforts to failure. Competition policy is a matter either of "interprovincial and international trade and commerce", or of trade and commerce
which is "national in its scope". As such it is within the federal trade
and commerce power. (For elaboration, see pp. 210-19.)
(2) Peace, order, and good government
Nearly as strong is the case for federal power under "peace, order,
and good government" (B.N.A. Act, s. 91). The question which has to
be answered here is whether the Competition Bill deals with a matter
which "goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must
from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole".
The national character of the Canadian economy inevitably means that
competition policy goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests,
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and the objective of securing efficient allocation of Canada's resources
through competition policy "must from its inherent nature be the
concern of the Dominion as a whole". The Competition Bill is
accordingly within the "peace, order and good government" power of
the federal Parliament. (For elaboration, see pp. 219-25.)
(3) Criminal law
The arguments based on "trade and commerce" and "peace, order,
and good government" go to sustain the validity of the entire Bill. The
"criminal law" power is a third possible head of federal power (B. N.A.
Act, s. 91(27) ), but the strength of its support varies with the various
elements of the Bill. The existing Combines Investigation Act and its
antecedents have been consistently upheld over the years as criminal
law. Much of the present Bill can without question be sustained on the
same basis. The new criminal offences in the Bill, which are more
extensive (e.g. they apply to services) and more detailed (e.g. they set
out more consumer protection offences) than in the existing Act are
undoubtedly valid as criminal law. This is also true of the investigative
powers in the new Bill. (For elaboration, see pp. 202-5.)
Less clear is the validity as criminal law of the new regulatory
powers of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (pp. 205-7),
and the civil remedy for individuals who have suffered loss through a
breach of the Bill (pp. 207-9). Even these provisions, however, are arguably valid as incidental to criminal law. (For elaboration, see pp.
205-9). However, if the Competition Bill is held to be a valid law
within the "trade and commerce" power or the "peace, order, and
good government" power, then the validity of the Commission's
powers and the civil remedy would not be open to challenge.
A special problem surrounds the vesting of compulsory criminal
jurisdiction in the Federal Court of Canada. There is doubt as to whether
the federal Parliament has power to vest criminal jurisdiction in a
federally-created court or tribunal. Laskin, writing as a law professor,
has strongly asserted that the federal Parliament does have the power,
but other writers and judges have disagreed. There is no decided case on
point, but our view is that Laskin is correct, and that this provision of the
Competition Bill is probably valid as well. (For elaboration, see
pp. 209-10.)
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ADDENDUM
After the foregoing paper was written, but before it was printed, the
Supreme Court of Canada rendered its judgment in MacDonald v.
Vapor CanadaLtd. on January 30, 1976 (not yet reported). The decision
of the Federal Court of Appeal in this case, which is described at
p. 215 of the paper, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court held that s. 7(e) of the federal Trade Marks Act
was unconstitutional. It will be recalled that s. 7(e) prohibits business
practices which are "contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage
in Canada". The principal opinion was written by Laskin, C.J.C., and
concurred in by Spence, Pigeon, Dickson and Beetz, JJ. A separate
concurring opinion was written by de Grandpr6, J., and concurred in by
Martland and Judson, JJ. However, de Grandpr6, J.'s brief opinion did
not indicate any disagreement with Laskin, C.J.C.'s reasoning and did
not really do much more than repeat Laskin, C.J.C.'s conclusions.
In addition to the trade and commerce power (and the treaty power
with which we are not concerned), there was an argument based on the
criminal law power. The criminal law argument was not very strong
because the Trade Marks Act did not impose any criminal sanction for
breach of s. 7 of the Act. The only sanction was a civil action for
injunction, damages or an accounting of profits. However, it was
apparently argued that because s. 115 of the Criminal Code imposes a
criminal sanction for breach of any federal statute which does not
include its own criminal sanction, which would include s. 7 of the Trade
Marks Act, s. 7 could be treated as criminal. Such an argument would of
course validate virtually any federal law, and Laskin, C.J.C., dismissed
it rather easily as "an extravagant posture". However, in what is
probably an obiter dictum, he went on to say that the GoodyearTire case
"does not, in any way, give any encouragement to federal legislation
which, in a situation unrelated to any criminal proceedings, would
authorize independent civil proceedings for damages and an injunction". This dictum appears to be relevant to pp. 207-8 of the paper,
although Laskin, C.J.C., does not refer to the Direct Lumber case, in
which the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that an independent civil
action could be included in a criminal statute. Probably, his remark must
be read in the context of a statutory provision which itself contained no
criminal sanction.
In rejecting the argument based on the trade and commerce power,
Laskin, C.J.C., pointed out that the various prescriptions of s. 7(a)
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through (d) of the Trade Marks Act were simply enactments (with minor
modifications) of existing civil causes of action, known both to the
common law and the civil law. Section 7(e) went beyond existing civil
causes of action, but was really only an extension of tortious or delictual
liability. As such, s. 7 was confined to matters within provincial
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the law applied "throughout Canada"
was not "a sufficient peg on which to support the legislation". The
position might well have been different, Laskin, C.J.C., said several
times, if s. 7 was part of a "regulatory scheme" administered by a
"federally-appointed agency". But "such a detached provision [as
s. 7(e)] cannot survive alone unconnected to a general regulatory
scheme to govern trading relations going beyond merely local concern". These qualifications by Laskin, C.J.C., appear to leave
untouched the basic argument of our paper that a comprehensive scheme
for the regulation of competition throughout Canada, monitored by a
federally-appointed agency, is within the trade and commerce power.
There was no discussion in the Vapor case of the peace, order, and
good government power.

